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In Private Information Retrieval (PIR), a client queries an n-bit database in order to retrieve an
entry of her choice, while maintaining privacy of her query value. Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz,
and Sudan showed that, in the information-theoretical setting, a linear amount of communication is
required for classical PIR protocols (thus the trivial protocol is optimal). This linear lower bound was
shown by Nayak to hold also in the quantum setting. Here, we extend Nayak’s result by considering
approximate privacy, and requiring security only against specious adversaries, which are, in analogy
to classical honest-but-curious adversaries, the weakest reasonable quantum adversaries. We show
that, even in this weakened scenario, Quantum Private Information Retrieval (QPIR) requires n
qubits of communication. From this follows that Le Gall’s recent QPIR protocol with sublinear
communication complexity is not information-theoretically private, against the weakest reasonable
cryptographic adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cryptographic scheme of Private Information
Retrieval (PIR) describes the problem of querying a
database without suffering a loss in privacy. It was for-
mally defined in 1998 by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz,
and Sudan [4]. Intuitively, not losing privacy through a
query means that the database server does not learn any-
thing about the client’s input. An interesting question is:
How much communication does a PIR protocol require?
Sending the whole database to the client is a trivial PIR
protocol, but it seems unsatisfactory with respect to the
amount of communication. Are there better solutions?
In the setting of one database server and information-
theoretic privacy, the trivial protocol is optimal (even
against honest-but-curious adversaries). This result was
shown by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan [4].
Quantum computation and quantum communication,
compared to the classical model, allows for improved so-
lutions to cryptographic tasks [2, 17]. A natural question
thus arises: does quantum information allow PIR proto-
cols with sublinear communication complexity? We call
a PIR protocol where we make use of quantum resources
a Quantum Private Information Retrieval (QPIR) proto-
col. Nayak answered this question in the negative [16],
with a proof sketch establishing a reduction to random
access encoding.1 There are also other fields where al-
lowing quantum computation and communication failed
to qualitatively improve the classical result. An example
is bit commitment: as we know, perfect bit commitment
is not possible in the classical setting; in the quantum
∗Electronic address: amin.baumeler@usi.ch
†Electronic address: abroadbe@uottawa.ca
1 It has been claimed [13] that Nayak proved a lower bound for
two-message quantum protocols only, when in fact, his claim en-
compasses protocols with arbitrary interaction. We attribute this
misunderstanding to the succinctness of Nayak’s original write-
up (the result and proof are only a few sentences long).
setting it is also not possible [14, 15] (but see Chailloux
and Kerenidis [3] for some quantum improvements that
are possible).
Recently, Le Gall presented a QPIR protocol with a
sublinear amount of communication [13]. This result
holds for a database that exactly follows the protocol
specification. Motivated by this seemingly contradictory
result, we study here the communication complexity of
QPIR protocols that are secure against specious adver-
saries. As defined by Dupuis, Nielsen, and Salvail [5],
specious adversaries may deviate from the protocol, but
only in a way that is essentially indistinguishable from
the honest behaviour—they are a quantum analogue of
classical honest-but-curious adversaries, thus correspond-
ing to the weakest reasonable cryptographic adversaries.
a. Main result We show that, even in the case of ap-
proximate privacy and approximate correctness, QPIR
against specious adversaries has linear communication
complexity.2 This establishes that the adversarial model
in Le Gall’s analysis does not fulfill the weakest reason-
able security definition and closes the topic of single-
server, information-theoretic QPIR.
b. Related Work Nayak’s lower bound was general-
ized by Jain, Radhakrishnan, and Sen [8], who showed
a trade-off for the loss in privacy between the client and
database. QPIR has also been studied in the scenario
of multiple servers [10, 11], in the scenario of symmetric
privacy [11], as well as in the scenario where a cheating
server is detected [6]. Recently, a practical symmetric
QPIR protocol which is not unconditionally secure was
developed [9].
2 This result has appeared as part of the M. Sc. thesis of one of
the authors [1].
2A. Specious adversaries
We call a party which follows a protocol honest. A
correct protocol is a protocol that achieves its task, given
that all the parties are honest. Clearly, every meaning-
ful protocol has to be correct. If we now try to restrict
the actions of an adversary as much as possible, we can-
not violate the correctness requirement. This means, the
weakest adversary has to appear honest.
In classical cryptography there exists a notion of
honest-but-curious adversaries, which models the above
description. Such adversaries follow the protocol (hon-
esty), but record everything they see and try to extract a
secret (curiosity). A classical honest-but-curious adver-
sary can do nothing more to break the privacy property
of a protocol.
Dupuis, Nielsen, and Salvail followed this spirit and in-
troduced the quantum analog to the honest-but-curious
adversaries, and called them specious [5]. The honesty
property, as well as the curiosity property cannot be
translated one-to-one from the classical to the quantum
case. To get a meaningful model, the definition needs to
capture the essence of being the weakest adversary, as
described above.
Attempting a translation from the classical to the
quantum case, we see that a quantum adversary can also
follow the protocol to be honest. Curiosity means to
copy everything the adversary sees and extracting a se-
cret from it. In general, copying is not possible because
of the no-cloning theorem [18]. Therefore, a protocol can
force a quantum honest-but-curious adversary to forget.
This motivates the need for a security guarantee not only
at the end of the protocol, but also during the interaction.
Quantum adversaries, on the other hand, can act in
a way indistinguishable from an honest party. As an
example, in some protocols it may be possible to delay
measurements. This means, the adversary skips a mea-
surement instruction and continues in superposition. At
a later point in the protocol, if required, the adversary
can perform the measurement, making it look like it was
honest all the time. In other words, at any step during
the execution of the protocol, we specify that the ad-
versary should be able to provide some state that, when
joined with the state held by the honest party, is indistin-
guishable from the joint state of an honest interaction.
This is the essence of the definition of specious adver-
saries, which we define formally in Section II C.
While the concept of specious adversaries is not yet in
widespread use in the quantum cryptographic commu-
nity, purification attacks and the related purified adver-
saries have long been known to present subtle challenges
unique to the quantum world. Charles Bennett and Gilles
Brassard were among the first to draw attention to this
type of attack, proposing a quantum bit commitment
scheme, together with an explicit purification attack [2].
Purified adversaries (who can be seen as delaying their
input choices by sending entangled states) are easily seen
to be a special case of specious adversaries.
B. Le Gall’s QPIR protocol
Recently, Le Gall presented a QPIR protocol with
information-theoretic privacy [13]. His protocol achieves
a communication complexity of O (√n), where n is the
database size in bits. At first glance, this result seems to
beat Nayak’s lower bound of n. However, the price for
this lower communication complexity is that the server
must follow the protocol precisely. Hence, Le Gall con-
siders a different model of adversaries. One naturally
wonders if such gains can be achieved by specious ad-
versaries. Our main result (Theorem 4) rules out this
possibility.
II. FORMAL MODEL AND SECURITY
DEFINITIONS
In this section, we formally define our model and no-
tions of correctness and privacy. First, we give some basic
notation.
A. Notation
We use calligraphic symbols to describe Hilbert spaces.
Subscripts of quantum states and quantum operations
usually denote the associated Hilbert spaces. Let A
and B be two Hilbert spaces. By A ⊗ B we denote the
joint Hilbert space. The set L(A,B) is the set of all
linear maps from A to B. The set L(A) = L(A,A) is
the set of all linear maps on A. A quantum state is ei-
ther expressed as a ket |x〉 or as a density operator ρ.
Every state than can be written as |x〉 is pure, with cor-
responding density operator |x〉〈x|. The set S(A) is the
set of all density operators on A. The identity operator
on the space A is 1A ∈ L(A), for a joint space A ⊗ B
we use 1A,B. An operator U ∈ L(A) is called unitary,
if U†U = 1. In the expression A ≈ B, the symbol ≈ de-
notes that the dimension of A equals the dimension of B
(i.e., dim(A) = dim(B)). The measurement outcome of
a measurement M of a density operator ρ is expressed
by M(ρ).
Let ρ, σ ∈ S(A) be two density operators. We denote
by ‖ρ‖1 = tr |ρ| the trace norm of the density operator ρ.
The trace distance between the two density operators ρ
and σ is defined as
∆(ρ, σ) :=
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1 . (1)
If ρ = |x〉〈x| and σ = |y〉〈y| are pure, then we
use the compact notation ∆(|x〉, |y〉) interchangeably
with ∆(|x〉〈x|, |y〉〈y|).
3B. Protocol definition
As mentioned in Section IA, when defining secu-
rity against specious adversaries, we must examine the
system held by the adversary during the protocol. To
this end, we first formally define a two-party quantum
protocol. We base our definition on the strategy formal-
ism of Gutoski and Watrous [7], as well as on a defini-
tion from Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail [5] (our scenario
is simpler since our protocols do not make any explicit
oracle calls). Without loss of generality, we assume that
party A sends the first and last messages.
Definition 1 (Two-party quantum protocol). An s-
round, two-party protocol denoted Π = (A ,B, s) consists
of:
1. input spaces A0 and B0 for parties A and B
respectively,
2. memory spaces A1, . . . ,As for A and B1, . . . ,Bs
for B and communication spaces X1, . . . ,Xs,
Y1, . . . ,Ys−1,
3. an s-tuple of quantum operations (A1, . . . ,As)
for A , where A1 : L(A0) 7→ L(A1 ⊗ X1), and
Ai : L(Ai−1 ⊗ Yi−1) 7→ L(Ai ⊗Xi), (2 ≤ i ≤ s),
4. an s-tuple of quantum operations (B1, . . . ,Bs)
for B, where Bi : L(Bi−1 ⊗ Xi) 7→ L(Bi ⊗ Yi),
(1 ≤ i ≤ s− 1), and Bs : L(Bs−1 ⊗Xs) 7→ L(Bs).
If Π = (A ,B, s) is an s-round two-party protocol, we
define the state after the i-th step (1 ≤ i ≤ 2s), and upon
input state ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R), where R is a system
of dimension dim(R) = dim(A0) dim(B0), as
ρi (ρin) := (A(i+1)/2 ⊗ 1B(i−1)/2,R) . . .
(B1 ⊗ 1A1,R) (A1 ⊗ 1B0,R) (ρin) , (2)
for i odd, and
ρi (ρin) := (Bi/2 ⊗ 1Ai/2,R) . . .
(B1 ⊗ 1A1,R) (A1 ⊗ 1B0,R) (ρin) , (3)
for i even. Note that the last round (round s) is only
partial, since Bs : L(Bs−1⊗Xs) 7→ L(Bs). We define the
final state of protocol Π = (A ,B, s), upon input state
ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R) as:
[A ⊛B] (ρin) := ρ2s (ρin) . (4)
The communication complexity of Π = (A ,B, s) is
the total amount of quantum communication in the
protocol (counted in terms of qubits), as given by∑s
i=1 log(dim(Xi)) +
∑s−1
i=1 log(dim(Yi)).
Given a protocol Π = (A ,B, s), an adver-
sary A˜ for A is an s-tuple of quantum operations
(A˜1, . . . , A˜s), where A˜1 : L(A0) 7→ L(A˜1 ⊗ X1), and
A˜i : L(A˜i−1 ⊗ Yi−1) 7→ L(A˜i ⊗Xi), (2 ≤ i ≤ s), with
A˜1, . . . , A˜s being A˜ ’s memory spaces. We denote the
final state of a protocol run with an adversary A˜
by [A˜ ⊛ B] (ρin). The state after the i-th step of a
protocol run with an adversary A˜ is ρ˜i(A˜ , ρin).
A special type of adversary for a protocol
Π = (A ,B, s), is a purified adversary, A¯ for A
that is described by unitaries (A¯1, . . . , A¯s), where
A¯1 : L(A0 ⊗ A¯0) 7→ L(A1 ⊗ A¯1 ⊗ X1) and
A¯i : L(Ai−1 ⊗ A¯i−1 ⊗ Yi−1) 7→ L(Ai ⊗ A¯i ⊗ Xi),
(2 ≤ i ≤ s), with auxiliary space A¯0 of sufficiently
large dimension being initialized to the zero state.
We refer to A¯1, . . . , A¯s as the purifying spaces and
specify that tracing out the purifying space reverts
the state to a state from the original protocol; in
particular, this holds for the final state of the protocol:
trA¯s [A¯ ⊛B] (ρin) = [A ⊛B] (ρin) for all ρin. It is not
hard to see that such adversaries always exist (see, for
instance Gutoski and Watrous [7]). The definition of a
purified adversary, B¯ for B is obtained similarly as the
definition for A¯ . In particular, Π =
(
A¯ , B¯, s
)
denotes
the protocol where both parties A and B are purified.
C. Specious adversaries
Recall the intuition that a specious adversary should
be able, at each step of the protocol, to produce a state
that, when joined with the honest party’s state, is close
(in trace distance) to the joint state of an honest exe-
cution of the protocol. Dupuis, Nielsen, and Salvail [5]
give a definition for specious adversaries in the most gen-
eral context. For the purposes of QPIR in our model,
the following is an equivalent definition; below we also
define ultimately specious adversaries, which are adver-
saries that satisfy the criteria for speciousness at the last
step of the protocol.
Definition 2 (specious adversaries). Let Π = (A ,B, s)
be an s-round two-party protocol. We say that an
adversary A˜ for A is ε-specious, if there exists a se-
quence of quantum operations (F1, . . . ,F2s), such that
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2s and for all ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R),
1.
Fi :
{
L(A˜(i+1)/2) 7→ L(A(i+1)/2), i even
L(A˜i ⊗Xi/2+1) 7→ L(Ai ⊗Xi/2+1), i odd
(5)
2. for every input state ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R),
∆((Fi ⊗ 1Bi,R)(ρ˜i(A˜ , ρin)), ρi(ρin)) ≤ ε . (6)
We call an adversary A˜ for A ultimately ε-specious, if
there exists a quantum operation F : L(A˜s) 7→ L(As),
such that for every input state ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R),
∆((F ⊗ 1Bs,R)(
[
A˜ ⊛B
]
(ρin)), [A ⊛B] (ρin)) ≤ ε .
(7)
4D. Definitions for QPIR
Using the formalism developed so far, we now define
QPIR protocols. In particular, we define a notion of ap-
proximate correctness, together with a notion of approx-
imate privacy against specious servers; correctness refers
to the notion that the client should obtain the correct
outcome at the end of the protocol, while privacy refers to
the notion that the server should learn essentially noth-
ing about the client’s input via its interaction with the
client. For specious adversaries, this corresponds to the
intuitive notion that the server’s local density matrix at
each step of the protocol should be independent of the
client’s input i; in other words, there must exist at each
step of the protocol, a quantum map S that has access
only to the server’s input register and that reproduces,
or simulates the server’s local view. This is the stan-
dard ideal-real world simulation-based security notion,
that is simplified to the QPIR setting and required only
for specious adversaries.
We also consider ultimate privacy (i.e., the privacy con-
dition holds at the end of the protocol) against purified
servers, which is sufficient in order to show our result.
Definition 3 (QPIR protocol). An s-round, n-bit Quan-
tum Private Information Retrieval protocol is a two-party
protocol ΠQPIR = (A ,B, s), where A is the server and B
is the client.
We call ΠQPIR (1 − δ)-correct if, for all inputs
ρin = |x〉〈x|A0 ⊗ |i〉〈i|B0 , with x = x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}n
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a measurement M with
outcome 0 or 1, such that:
Pr[M (trAs [A ⊛B] (ρin)) = xi] ≥ 1− δ . (8)
We call ΠQPIR (1 − ε)-private against γ-specious
servers if for every γ-specious server A˜ , there exists
a sequence of quantum operations S1, . . . ,Ss−1 where
Si : L(A0) 7→ L(A˜i ⊗ Yi), such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ s− 1
and for all ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R),
∆
(
trB0 ((Si ⊗ 1B0,R)(ρin)) , trBi
(
ρ˜i(A˜ , ρin)
))
≤ ε ,
(9)
We call ΠQPIR ultimately (1−ε)-private against purified
servers if for every purification A¯ of the server A there
exists a quantum operation S : L(A0) 7→ L(As ⊗ A¯s),
such that for all ρin ∈ S(A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R),
∆
(
trB0 (S ⊗ 1B0,R) (ρin), trBs [A¯ ⊛B] (ρin)
) ≤ ε .
(10)
III. TOOLS
In this section, we present definitions and results that
are used in the proof of our main result.
A. Entropy
Definition 4 (Shannon entropy). Let PX be a probabil-
ity distribution over the alphabet X . Then the Shannon
entropy H(PX) of PX is
H(PX) := −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) log (PX(x)) . (11)
The Shannon entropy of a binary random variable is
called binary entropy:
Definition 5 (binary entropy). Let p be the probability
of an event of a binary random variable. Then the binary
entropy Hbin(p) of p is
Hbin(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) . (12)
B. Trace distance and fidelity
We have already encountered the trace norm and trace
distance in Section IIA. Another measure of distance be-
tween two density operators ρ and σ is the fidelity, de-
fined as
F (ρ, σ) :=
∥∥∥ρ 12σ 12 ∥∥∥
1
. (13)
For pure states |x〉, and |y〉 we define F (|x〉, |y〉)
as F (|x〉〈x|, |y〉〈y|). The following Lemma simplifies the
calculation of the fidelity.
Lemma 1 (Uhlmann’s Lemma). The fidelity between
ρA ∈ S(A) and σA ∈ S(A) is
F (ρA, σA) = max
|ϕ〉A,B,|ψ〉A,B
F (|ϕ〉A,B, |ψ〉A,B) (14)
= max
|ϕ〉A,B,|ψ〉A,B
|〈ϕ|ψ〉A,B | , (15)
where the maximum is taken over all purifications
of ρA = trB|ϕ〉〈ϕ|A,B and over all purifications of
σA = trB|ψ〉〈ψ|A,B.
Recall the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities, relating the
fidelity to the trace distance:
Lemma 2 (Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities). Let
ρ, σ ∈ S(A) be density operators, then
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ ∆(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 . (16)
The following lemma states that, given two density
matrices that are close in trace distance, it is possible,
by acting only on the purifying subspace, to transform
a purification of one of the density matrices into an ap-
proximate version of a purification of the other.
Lemma 3. Let ρA, σA ∈ S(A) be two ε-close density
operators, such that
∆(ρA, σA) ≤ ε (17)
5with respective purifications |ϕ〉A,B and |ψ〉A,B. Then
there exists a unitary UB acting solely on B, such that
∆(|ϕ〉A,B, (1A ⊗ UB) |ψ〉A,B) ≤
√
ε(2− ε) . (18)
Proof of Lemma 3. Let ρA, σA ∈ S(A) be two density
operators, such that ∆(ρA, σA) ≤ ε. By the first in-
equality of Lemma 2 we get
F (ρA, σA) ≥ 1− ε . (19)
Let the state |ϕ〉A,B be an arbitrary purification of the
density operator ρA. By Lemma 1, there exists a purifi-
cation |ψ′〉A,B of the density operator σA, such that
F (ρA, σA) = F (|ϕ〉A,B, |ψ′〉A,B) . (20)
Therefore, the fidelity lower bound (19) is also a lower
bound for the fidelity between the pure states |ϕ〉A,B
and |ψ′〉A,B. Using this in the second inequality of
Lemma 2 yields
∆(|ϕ〉A,B , |ψ′〉A,B) ≤
√
1− F (|ϕ〉A,B, |ψ′〉A,B)2 . (21)
By squaring both sides and plugging in inequality (19)
we get
∆(|ϕ〉A,B, |ψ′〉A,B)2 ≤ 1− F (|ϕ〉A,B , |ψ′〉A,B)2 (22)
≤ 1− (1 − ε)2 (23)
= ε(2− ε) . (24)
Because purifications are equivalent up to unitary trans-
formations on the purifying system, we thus get
∆ (|ϕ〉A,B, (1A ⊗ UB) |ψ〉A,B) ≤
√
ε(2− ε) , (25)
where
(1A ⊗ UB) |ψ〉A,B = |ψ′〉A,B . (26)
C. The Schmidt decomposition and its properties
The Schmidt compression allows for a lossless compres-
sion of a quantum state. We first describe the Schmidt
decomposition.
Theorem 1 (Schmidt decomposition). Let |ψ〉A,B be a
pure state shared between party A and party B. Then
there exists a set of orthonormal pure states {|ai〉A} for
party A , a set of orthonormal pure states {|bi〉B} for
party B, a set of real coefficients {λi} called Schmidt
coefficients, and a positive integer r called Schmidt rank,
such that
|ψ〉A,B =
r∑
i=1
λi|ai〉A|bi〉B . (27)
Because the spaces A and B use only r different or-
thonormal pure states, both spaces can be compressed in-
dependently to spaces of dimension r with ⌈log r⌉ qubits.
This is known as Schmidt compression.
The following theorem states that we can bound the
Schmidt rank of a bipartite state resulting from a puri-
fied two-party protocol. This theorem is attributed to
Kremer [12] (see Lemma 5).
Theorem 2 (bound on Schmidt rank). Let
Π =
(
A¯ , B¯, s
)
be a two-party quantum protocol with
purified parties A¯ and B¯, and let ρin = |φ0〉A,B be
a pure product state. Suppose Π has communication
complexity c. Then [A¯ ⊛ B¯] (ρin) has Schmidt rank at
most 2c.
Proof of Theorem 2. In the following, we ignore unitary
operations on either side during the protocol, because
such operations do not increase the Schmidt rank.
Let |φd〉A,B be the shared state after d qubits have
been communicated and let
|φd〉A,B =
r∑
i=1
λi|ai〉A|bi〉B (28)
be the corresponding Schmidt decomposition. The terms
belonging to party A from the Schmidt decomposi-
tion (28) can be expanded as
|ai〉A = αi|a0i 〉Aℓ |0〉Ar + βi|a1i 〉Aℓ |1〉Ar . (29)
Without loss of generality, assume that in the next step
in the protocol, the qubit from the space Ar is sent from
party A to party B. By plugging in the expanded ex-
pression (29) into the Schmidt decomposition (28), we
get
|φd〉A,B =
r∑
i=1
λi
(
αi|a0i 〉Aℓ |0〉Ar + βi|a1i 〉Aℓ |1〉Ar
) |bi〉B
(30)
=
r∑
i=1
λiαi|a0i 〉Aℓ |0〉Ar |bi〉B + λiβi|a1i 〉Aℓ |1〉Ar |bi〉B .
(31)
Hence the transmission of one qubit at most doubles the
number of summands, which is an upper bound of the
Schmidt rank of the new Schmidt decomposition into
the spaces Aℓ and Ar ⊗ B. By assumption, the initial
state |φ0〉A,B has Schmidt rank 1. Therefore, after com-
municating c qubits the Schmidt rank is at most 2c.
D. Random access encoding
A random access encoding is an encoding of classical
database as a density operator, such that any database
item can be extracted with a certain probability using
a measurement which is independent of the database.
6It is easy to see that the message of a single-message
QPIR protocol is a random access encoding of the server’s
database. We state the definition of random access en-
coding and a theorem on their size; here, we consider
the average case scenario, which follows from Nayak’s
work [16] (see also Kerenidis and de Wolf [10], Ap-
pendix B).
Definition 6 (Random Access Encoding). An
(n,m, p)-random access encoding is a function f
that maps n-bit strings to density operators over m
qubits, such that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists
a measurement Mi with outcome 0 or 1 that has the
property that on average over all x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr [Mi (f (x)) = xi] ≥ p . (32)
Theorem 3 (size of Random Access Encoding).
Any (n,m, p)-random access encoding satisfies
m ≥ (1−Hbin (p))n.
IV. MAIN THEOREM
In this section, we present our main result and related
corollaries. The proof is given in Section IVB.
A. Results
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 4. Let ΠQPIR = (A ,B, s) be an s-round, n-
bit QPIR protocol, that is (1 − δ)-correct and ultimately
(1− ε)-private against purified servers. Then ΠQPIR has
communication complexity of at least
(
1−Hbin
(
1− δ − 2
√
ε(1− ε)
))
n . (33)
The above theorem is an extension of Nayak’s result on
QPIR [16] to approximate privacy, and requiring security
only against a purified server at the end of the protocol.
It is easy to see that a purified server is specious (see Sec-
tion II B). Therefore, any QPIR protocol that is (1 − ε)-
private against γ-specious servers is also (1− ε)-private
against purified serves. Trivially such a protocol is ul-
timately (1− ε)-private against purified servers. Hence,
by Theorem 4 we get.
Corollary 1. Let ΠQPIR = (A ,B, s) be an s-round, n-bit
QPIR protocol that is (1− δ)-correct and (1− ε)-private
against γ-specious servers. Then for any γ, ΠQPIR has
communication complexity of at least
(
1−Hbin
(
1− δ − 2
√
ε(1− ε)
))
n . (34)
Let δ and ε be nonnegative and negligible functions3
with respect to n. Then for any γ, the communication
complexity as given in Corollary 1 at least n− o (1). In
sharp contrast to this, in Le Gall’s model (that considers
an adversary that follows the protocol exactly), the com-
munication complexity is O (√n); we therefore obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. Le Gall’s QPIR protocol is not private
against γ-specious adversaries, for any γ.
An alternate proof of Corollary 2, via an explicit
specious attack, can be found in the thesis of A¨. B. [1].
B. Proof of Theorem 4
The main technique used in the proof of Theorem 4
is to reduce a given QPIR protocol to a random access
encoding, and then apply Nayak’s lower bound as estab-
lished by Theorem 3. This is the same technique as used
by Nayak in his lower bound proof for QPIR, which we
extend here to the case of approximate privacy against
ultimately specious servers.
As a starting point to understanding the reduction,
note that any single-message QPIR protocol (where one
message is sent from the server to the client) implements
a random access encoding. Hence, the lower bound on
the size of the random access encoding is also a lower
bound on the communication complexity for the single-
message QPIR protocol. We generalize this idea to ul-
timately (1 − ε)-private against purified servers, multi-
round QPIR protocols by reducing the multi-round pro-
tocol to a single-message protocol, and hence to a ran-
dom access encoding. Taking care that this procedure
does not increase the amount of communication allows
us to apply the lower bound on the size of the random
access encoding to the communication complexity of the
multi-step QPIR protocol, thus establishing the result.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ΠQPIR be an s-round, n-bit,
(1 − δ)-correct Quantum Private Information Retrieval
protocol that is ultimately (1 − ε)-private against puri-
fied servers and that has communication complexity c.
Consider ΠQPIR(A¯ , B¯), the modification of ΠQPIR,
where both parties, A and B, are purified, as described
in Section II B. We denote by S ≈ As ⊗ A¯s the server’s
subspace, and by C ≈ Bs ⊗ B¯s the client’s subspace at
the end of the protocol. Furthermore, let
|ψ¯x,i〉〈ψ¯x,i|S,C := [A¯ ⊛ B¯] (|x〉〈x| ⊗ |i〉〈i|) ; (35)
that is, |ψ¯x,i〉S,C is the global state at the end of the
protocol ΠQPIR(A¯ , B¯), with inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n for the
database and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} for the index.
3 A nonnegative function µ is called negligible with respect to n if
for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large n, µ(n) < n−c.
7Encoding. Given ΠQPIR(A¯ , B¯), we derive a random
access encoding in the following way: the server simulates
the purified version ΠQPIR(A¯ , B¯) of the protocol ΠQPIR
with inputs |x〉 as database input and index |i〉 = |1〉.
The joint output is |ψ¯x,1〉S,C .
Consider |ξ〉D, the uniform superposition of all possible
databases
|ξ〉D := 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉D , (36)
and let
|νi〉〈νi|S,C : = [A¯ ⊛ B¯] (|ξ〉〈ξ|D ⊗ |i〉〈i|) . (37)
Since we consider the case where both parties are puri-
fied, the final global state is
|νi〉S,C = 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|ψ¯x,i〉S,C . (38)
By Theorem 2, the Schmidt decomposition of |νi〉S,C
into the subspace S and C has Schmidt rank at most 2c.
Hence there exists a Schmidt compression of the sub-
space C into at most c qubits. By linearity, this map
can be used to compress (and decompress) |ψ¯x,1〉S,C for
any x ∈ {0, 1}n. The server applies this compression
on system C of |ψ¯x,1〉S,C . Let the result of the compres-
sion be |ψ¯cx,1〉S,C′ . The server outputs as encoding of
database x the state of the subsystem C′:
trS |ψ¯cx,1〉〈ψ¯cx,1|S,C′ . (39)
Decoding. Given the output of the Encoding al-
gorithm, the client applies the inverse operation of the
Schmidt compression obtained above in order to recover
the joint state corresponding to the input i = 1:
|ψ¯x,1〉S,C . (40)
However, the client would like to recover the joint state
for an arbitrary i. To this end, consider again |ξ〉D,
the uniform superposition of databases as database in-
put, and fix i ∈ {1, . . . , n} as index input. Let the
corresponding input state be ρξ,iin . By the privacy
condition (Equation 10), there exists a quantum map
S : L(A0) 7→ L(As ⊗ A¯s), such that
∆
(
trB0 (S ⊗ 1B0,R) (ρξ,iin ), trBs [A¯ ⊛B]
(
ρ
ξ,i
in
))
≤ ε .
(41)
Since for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
trB0 (S ⊗ 1B0,R) (ρξ,1in ) = trB0 (S ⊗ 1B0,R) (ρξ,iin ) (42)
and
trBs [A¯ ⊛B]
(
ρ
ξ,i
in
)
= trC [A¯ ⊛ B¯]
(
ρ
ξ,i
in
)
(43)
= trC |νi〉〈νi|S,C , (44)
by the triangle inequality, we get that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
∆ (trC |ν1〉〈ν1|S,C , trC |νi〉〈νi|S,C) ≤ 2ε . (45)
Thus by Lemma 3, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists
a unitary U1→iC acting only on the client’s subspace, such
that
∆
((
1S ⊗ U1→iC
) |ν1〉S,C , |νi〉S,C) ≤ 2√ε(1− ε) . (46)
Because the trace distance does not increase under mea-
surements, we simply measure the space D of the states
from the inequality (46) and obtain that for a uniform
random x ∈ {0, 1}n
∆
((
1S ⊗ U1→iC
) |ψ¯x,1〉S,C , |ψ¯x,i〉S,C) ≤ 2√ε(1− ε) .
(47)
Hence, on average over all databases x ∈ {0, 1}n, this
family
{
U
1→i
C
}
i
of unitary operators can be used to con-
struct a 2
√
ε(1− ε)-close approximation.
It remains to calculate the recovery probability of
the constructed random access code. The QPIR pro-
tocol ΠQPIR is (1 − δ)-correct and hence there exists a
measurement that recovers the desired bit with a proba-
bility of at least 1− δ. The family of unitary approxima-
tion transformations
{
U
1→i
C
}
i
, used to approximate the
global state, induces a loss in the recovery probability.
The approximation is 2
√
ε(1− ε)-close.
Hence the QPIR protocol yields a random ac-
cess encoding with recovery probability of at least
1− δ − 2
√
ε(1− ε). By applying Nayak’s Theorem 3,
we get that any n-bit, (1 − δ)-correct, ultimately
(1− ε)-private against purified servers QPIR protocol
has communication complexity of at least(
1−Hbin
(
1− δ − 2
√
ε(1− ε)
))
n . (48)
It is interesting to note that the reason why this lower
bound proof is not applicable to the model in the work
of Le Gall [13], is that there the privacy condition (10)
does not hold. In other words, the possibility of Le Gall’s
result is a direct consequence of the fact that security is
guaranteed only for classical inputs, that is, the adversary
is forced to select a classical database at the beginning
of the protocol, or equivalently, is forced to measure any
superposition of databases that it might receive as input.
V. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Using quantum computation and quantum commu-
nication, non-trivial information-theoretic single-server
QPIR protocols secure against any reasonable adversary
do not exist. This work closes the topic of single-server
and information-theoretic QPIR.
8An open question that remains, is whether there ex-
ist other applications of the reduction from multi-step
protocols to single-step protocols used in the proof of
the lower bound (see Section IV). In the reduction, we
show that any protocol with asymmetric privacy at the
end of the protocol against one particular type of adver-
saries, can be transformed to a single-step protocol. The
resulting single-step protocol preserves the communica-
tion complexity and the privacy property. This reduction
could potentially be used to build offline protocols from
a multi-step protocols. An offline protocol is a protocol,
where the parties are not required to be involved in the
protocol at the same time. This could be advantageous
under some circumstances.
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